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
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Bureau of Agricultural Economics



MEMORANDUM ON
MANPOWER IN AGRICULTURE FOR 1943

Washington, D. C.
March 1943

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This memorandum contains a revision and an expansion of the material presented in Manpower in Agriculture for 1943, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, August 1942. Estimates and projections given here supersede those appearing in the earlier statement.

NOTE

Throughout this report a distinction is made between farm population and farm employment, *i. e.*, between persons living on farms and persons working on farms. This is necessary because some persons living on farms are engaged chiefly in nonfarm work and some persons who work on farms do not live on farms. The number in each group varies from year to year and from season to season. On April 1, 1940, there were about 900,000 persons who were working on farms but not living on farms, and the number had not changed materially by April 1942. The number of persons living on farms but working in nonagricultural employment was approximately 2,100,000 on April 1, 1940, and had almost doubled by April 1942.

References to farm population deal only with rural-farm population and do not include the population on the very few farms which are located within urban areas (urban farms). The urban-farm population in 1940 amounted to only 1.1 percent of the total farm population.

SUMMARY

Agriculture's task during 1943 calls for increasing production substantially over the record levels of 1942 with considerably fewer farm men and experienced full-time farm workers than were available last year. Although the losses of farm people to industry and the armed forces are likely to be less during 1943 than during 1942, the prospects now are that the number of adult farm males engaged in farm work at the July peak in 1943 will be about 600,000 less than in 1942. Further substitutions of older men, school-age youth, and women for younger men and of inexperienced or physically less able for skilled and able-bodied workers are indicated.

Approximately 1,200,000 farm men have entered the armed forces in the 3 years preceding April 1943 and there have been extensive migrations from farms to towns and cities. Farm population declined by 2,600,000 between April 1940 and April 1943. Despite these decreases, farm employment during 1942 was approximately equal to that during 1941, and farm employment during the first quarter of 1943 continued at substantially the same levels as during the same period in 1942.

The volume of farm employment maintained during 1942 and the early part of this year was possible largely as a result of substitution of farm women and older children for farm men. To maintain total farm employment at last year's levels may mean, at the seasonal peak in July, the further substitution of 500,000 or more farm women and 100,000 or more persons under 14 years of age for the decrease since last July of about 600,000 rural-farm men in the agricultural working force. If the replacements are not secured from among the people living on farms, the number of nonfarm persons working on farms would need to be increased correspondingly. The changed composition of this year's farm working force may decrease its effective work capacity, unless offset by measures for better utilization of labor through a more effective distribution of the available supply and more full-time use of the operator and family labor on farming units with operations now too small to provide full-time employment.

Increasing farm employment from a seasonal low of 8.2 million in January to a seasonal high of 12 million in July will depend this year, as in other years, primarily upon persons living on farms. Of the total expected increase, 700,000 are farm men and 1,400,000 are farm women, 900,000 are children under 14 working primarily on their home farms. If these seasonal increases occur, the remaining 800,000 of the required increase must come primarily from persons not living on farms and from persons living on farms engaged primarily in nonfarm work.

Lower levels of both civilian and military migration in 1943 than in 1942 are probable, the latter because of regulations governing the deferment of farm workers. It is estimated that 0.4 million farm men will be inducted into the armed forces during 1943 but that, in the absence of such regulations, an estimated .8 million men would have been inducted this year, assuming a proportionate contribution to the armed forces from the rural-farm population. A continuation of present Selective Service regulations during the remainder of the year may mean the deferment of 60 to 75 percent of all men of military age regularly engaged in agriculture. Further liberalization of Selective Service regulations would increase the number of farm workers deferred, but many of these are now on small farms where their contribution to agricultural production is limited.

During 1943 the Nation's wartime industrial and military mobilization may be expected to approach rapidly the maximum levels essential to the support of all-out Allied offensives. The agricultural segment of the Nation's economy has the task this year of increasing total production by approximately 5 percent and food production by approximately 8 percent over the record year of 1942, while at the same time it may continue to contribute a portion of its manpower to the armed forces and to industries essential to the war effort. It is important, therefore, to examine the present manpower resources of the farm population, the size and kind of working force that it may support in relation to the production effort required and in relation to the steps taken and contemplated for dealing with the farm manpower problem this year, especially if American agriculture is to accomplish this very largely with its own manpower resources.

Attainment of 1943 agricultural production goals will require 3 to 4 percent more man-hours of labor than was necessary for 1942 production, assuming average yields. For 1942, estimates of labor requirements indicated that approximately 12 million workers were needed in the peak summer and fall months as compared with a seasonal low of 8.4 million in January. The volume of farm employment reported for the months of 1942 was substantially equal to the estimated requirements. Wartime changes in the composition of the working force, however, lowered its quality and effectiveness as a result of greater participation in farm work by women and children of the farm family and by new or inexperienced workers. This in turn necessitated such adjustments as more hours of work per week, more efficient use of labor and machines, improved management and farming practices as well as recourse to cooperative efforts to meet local labor needs.

Whether a farm working force equal to that of last year can achieve the production called for this year depends in part on what further efficiencies are attained in the utilization of the available labor supply and on what further changes take place in the composition of the working force. In general the probability for the absorption of the additional man-hours by a working force no greater than that of last year will be enhanced by any measures to retain essential skilled workers in farm work, and by measures designed to use available labor more productively. The latter include a more effective distribution of the farm labor supply and a more complete utilization of underemployed family labor on farm units with operations now too limited to provide full-time employment.

The Record for 1942

At the start of 1942 agricultural year, the defense and war effort had already resulted in a considerable release of manpower from farms in response to rapidly expanding industrial employment and the growth in size of the armed forces. In the two years preceding April 1942, nonfarm employment (excluding the armed forces) increased from 36.3 to 41.8 million, a net increase of 5.5 million workers, at the same time that 2.5 million men were withdrawn from all types of civilian pursuits into the armed forces (table 1). Losses of farm manpower occurred through migration from farms to civilian occupations and the armed forces, as well as through shifts into nonfarm occupations by

persons who continued residence on farms. By April 1942 it is estimated that there were 3.8 million farm residents employed in nonfarm occupations, as compared with 2.1 million in April 1940 (table 3). Although some of these persons continued to work in agriculture on a part-time basis. 1/ Thus the 1942 crop-year was begun with a labor supply on farms whose reserves, accumulated during pre-war years, were very materially reduced. The depletion of labor reserves necessitated many adjustments in labor utilization on farms as part of the transition from the surplus labor supply situation previously existing to a condition of labor scarcity. This transition was not accomplished without widespread apprehensions regarding threatening labor shortages, which generally did not materialize, as the reserves still left on farms were drawn upon more fully.

By midsummer, and even more so in the fall of 1942, the greatly accelerated inductions and enlistments into the armed forces, along with simultaneous expansion in employment in nonagricultural industries, created further drains on rural-farm manpower by the time of the seasonal peaks of harvesting operations when farm labor requirements expanded materially. An extremely tight labor situation prevailed during such peak periods as July and October, as is evident from an examination of the estimated losses of manpower that had occurred by then and of the types and sources of replacements that were utilized to accomplish 1942 farm production. Altogether it is estimated that about 2.8 million actual or potential workers, including more than 2 million men, were lost from the on-farm labor supply between April 1940 and July 1942. Losses to the armed forces accounted for 600,000, net civilian migration for 1,000,000, and net shifts of farm residents into occupations other than farming for 1,200,000. Except for the partially offsetting effect of the normal growth in the working age population on farms, 2/ these losses represented a net decrease in the labor supply living on farms. The decrease in the on-farm labor supply, however, has had little relationship to the actual net changes in total farm employment.

Some of these losses from the on-farm labor supply consisted of persons who before leaving the farms were either unemployed or considerably underemployed, or were already at work in nonfarm jobs; still others, primarily women, were persons who ordinarily were not employed but who entered the labor force in response to nonfarm work opportunities. Similarly a part of the losses occurring through shifts into nonfarm occupations by persons continuing residence on farms was also made up of the unemployed or nonworker groups. The losses of actual farm workers were offset through replacements by other persons, some of which came from the normal increase in the number of rural-farm persons of working age. The replacements made, however, altered the composition of the farm working force. It is estimated that there were 1.2 million fewer rural-farm

1/ It is estimated that in April 1942 approximately 800,000 persons whose major employment was nonagricultural also worked on farms the equivalent of at least 2 days during the reported work-week, as compared with an estimated 700,000 in April 1940 (table 1). The great majority of these persons are farm residents.

2/ Normal growth in the working age group of the rural-farm population is estimated at an annual rate of about 165,000 males and about 200,000 females; only a part of this increase in females of working age entered the labor force, whereas substantially all of the males did.

males (14 years of age and over) employed on farms in July 1942 than in July 1940. This decrease was largely offset by an increase of 500,000 in the number of rural-farm women (14 years of age and over) working on farms and by an increase of 400,000 in the number of children under 14 years of age. Total farm employment on July 1, 1942 was 12.0 million as compared with 11.9 million in July 1941 and with 12.3 million in July 1940. The fact that the losses of farm workers between July 1940 and July 1941 were not fully replaced by other persons entering farm employment, while the losses during the year July 1941-July 1942 were fully replaced, was in large part due to the presence of more labor than was actually needed on farms in 1940 and earlier years so that some of it did not need to be replaced.

These surpluses had been greatly reduced by the middle of 1941, and losses sustained thereafter apparently required replacement, primarily by farm persons not normally engaged in farm work a substantial part of the time. 3/ Since many of the replacements utilized in 1942 consisted of women, children, youths, and other categories of persons whose efficiency in general was less than that of the workers they replaced, the accomplishment of 1942 production necessitated fuller employment of the operators and experienced workers, as well as other means of maximizing labor utilization. Not in all instances did recourse to these measures enable the complete performance of all necessary work normally done on farms. In some cases maintenance and repairs had to be postponed to permit the performance of more pressing and immediate tasks. However, approximately 9 percent more man-hours of farm work were put in during 1942 than in 1941 by a working force which averaged only 0.3 percent greater. Thus, for example, the average number of hours worked per week on farms in July 1942 was 17 percent greater than in July 1941, and for the five busy months of the year (June through October) was 9 percent greater than in the corresponding months of 1941.

On the production side of the 1942 record, the output of all agricultural products was 12 percent greater than in 1941. While a part of this increase was the result of unusually favorable weather conditions and the accompanying high yields, a substantial part of the increase was due to an expansion in acreages and livestock numbers.

Factors in the 1943 Agricultural Manpower Situation

An appraisal of the 1943 agricultural manpower situation cannot be made without certain assumptions regarding the magnitude of net civilian and military migration from farms. The size of the armed forces by the end of this year is assumed to reach 10.8 million for all branches of the services, including officers and soldiers - an increase of approximately 4 million over the armed forces strength at the end of 1942. Estimates based on War Manpower Commission figures of manpower requirements for nonagricultural industries indicate that because of the expected employment contraction in less essential industries the combined increase in nonfarm employment and in the size of the armed forces during 1943 may be only 3.2 million. This represents a smaller expansion in nonagricultural

3/ The Bureau of Agricultural Economics monthly estimates of farm employment relate to persons working two or more days during the reporting week. An increase in employment would thus be reported if persons who normally did less than two days work began to give at least this much time to farm work.

employment and the armed forces combined than the increase of 6.1 million which occurred during 1942.

Net migration from farms will be affected not only by the expansion in the armed forces and by the need for replacing in industry workers drawn into the armed forces, but also by other factors. The total effect of these factors will probably be a reduction in net migration from farms during 1943 below the level of 1942 or 1941. The volume of net civilian migration from farms may be reduced because the large scale migrations of recent years have considerably reduced the number of people in the age groups in which migration is most common. Measures designed to lessen the removal of agricultural workers into the armed forces, will directly reduce the volume of military migration and may curtail the volume of civilian migration from farms. Current and future Selective Service regulations which have as their purpose the deferment from military service of essential farm workers may result in some return of former farm residents into agricultural employment. A third factor likely to affect net migration this year is that some of the workers needed in war industries will come from the anticipated reduction in employment in the less essential non-agricultural industries or from completed construction projects. 4/ Insofar as this shifting of workers lessens the demand for new workers, it reduces the pressure upon the farm population to yield additional workers. Wage controls and lengthening of the work week in industry as well as a continued upward movement in agricultural wage rates are other factors tending to diminish migration from farms. On the basis of all these considerations, a total net outmigration from the rural-farm population of 900,000 persons has been assumed in the projections for 1943 in the accompanying tables, of whom about 600,000 might be considered as actual or potential workers, the remaining 300,000 being persons under 14 years of age and other dependents. This contrasts with a total net outmigration in 1942 of 1,600,000 persons, and in 1941 of 1,357,000. Included in the 1943 net migration figure is an assumed withdrawal into the armed forces of approximately 430,000 rural-farm men, compared with an estimated withdrawal of 730,000 during 1942. If the farm population were to supply men to the armed forces in direct proportion to the current number of rural-farm males in military ages, it would provide a total of about 800,000 men. The assumption that only approximately 430,000 farm men will be taken into the armed forces allows for the estimated effect of present regulations governing the deferment of essential farm workers under a moderately liberal application of the 8 to 16 war unit standards, which were set up to determine who is to be considered a full-time worker in essential agricultural employment.

Present plans of the Department of Agriculture call for recruitment on an extensive scale of additional nonfarm persons for full- and part-time work in agriculture. The number of such workers needed can best be indicated by an examination of the available manpower resources of the farm population in relation to the effort required, should as much reliance be placed upon farm people alone as in the past. To facilitate the examination the accompanying projections for 1943 assume the same level of employment of nonfarm persons in farm work as in 1942.

4/ War Manpower Commission estimates of manpower requirements indicate that to provide the expanding needs of the armed forces, munitions industries and essential nonagricultural industries, over 3 million must come by reductions in employment in less essential nonagricultural industries.

The Spring Situation

Adult males who live and work on farms are, of course, the backbone of the farm working forces. The number of rural-farm males available for full-time work on farms this April is the smallest in many years. In view of the fact that women and children cannot be used nearly so much in spring work of field preparation and planting as in summer and fall operations, because of the special skills and physical capacities required by the work and the more restricted use of school age youth, the labor situation this spring is as stringent as any that may be experienced later in the year. The possibility of using machinery in spring work is, however, somewhat greater than at harvest time, and some reduction in manpower requirements is achievable through fuller use of available machinery.

It is estimated that migration from farms as well as the extraordinary shift of farm residents into nonfarm occupations have left only about 6.3 million farm males 14 years of age and over available for full-time farm work in April of this year, as compared with 6.7 million in April 1942 and 7.4 million in April 1940. If recent trends in the employment on farms of rural-farm women are continued, there may be approximately 1 million such persons working on farms in April of this year as compared with 700,000 a year ago. In addition to these 7.3 million farm workers (6.3 million men and 1.0 million women), it is estimated that the April total farm employment (about 9.5 million) includes 900,000 nonfarm persons 14 years of age and over working in agriculture, 500,000 persons under 14 years of age, the great majority of whom are unpaid family members working on their parents' farms, and some 800,000 persons, principally farm residents, who are primarily engaged in nonfarm occupations but who spend a sufficient amount of time in farm work to be included in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics estimate of farm employment. The numbers of workers in the last three categories are substantially the same as in April of last year. Maintenance of the same numbers of nonfarm persons working in agriculture in April 1943 as in April 1942 has required replacements, for this group of agricultural workers has also lost persons to industry and the armed forces, possibly at a somewhat higher rate than has the group of agricultural workers who live on farms.

There is some evidence that the number of nonfarm persons who work in agriculture is currently below last year's level, although total farm employment is substantially the same as in 1942. At the beginning of March 1943, total farm employment had increased seasonally from the low point in January by about the same amount as in preceding years and was equal to the March 1942 level. The number of hired farm workers during the first quarter of this year has averaged 6 percent under the corresponding quarter of last year, but the percentage decrease in the number of nonfarm persons working in agriculture (who are mostly in the hired worker category) has probably been greater. However, in view of the recruitment activities currently carried on and contemplated by agencies of the Department among nonfarm persons, as well as the possible effect of draft deferment regulations, it seems reasonable to assume for 1943 an average level of employment of nonfarm persons in agriculture approximately equal to that for 1942.

Harvest Time Outlook

The prospective situation for July 1943 will be influenced materially by the drains on the on-farm labor supply that have occurred so far and that may take place by midsummer and fall of this year. Should the assumptions with respect to civilian and military migration from farms provide a fair approximation to the levels which actually occur, a further net loss of approximately 1.2 million actual or potential workers will have taken place from July 1942 to July 1943, the major part of which has already occurred. 5/ Approximately 700,000 of these will have gone into the armed forces, while net civilian migration will have removed another 375,000. It is also estimated that an additional 100,000 farm residents will have shifted into nonfarm occupations without actually migrating from farms. Males will probably make up about a million of these losses. Since some of these losses will be from nonworkers or from nonfarm workers, and since normal increases in the working age population will have replaced a part of the losses, farm employment in July of this year may show a net decrease of only about 550,000 rural-farm males 14 years of age and over. To offset this net decrease will require compensating increases in other groups of workers, possibly 100,000 children under 14 and 450,000 or more rural-farm women.

The greatly expanded labor requirements accompanying the seasonal pattern of farm activities has normally resulted in a net increase in farm employment from January 1 to July 1 of about 3.5 million workers consisting of approximately 2 million unpaid family workers and 1.5 million hired workers including paid members of the family. The types and sources of this seasonal increase in farm workers may be illustrated for a fairly normal year like 1940 when 8.5 million workers were employed on farms on January 1. In that year farm employment rose from January 1 to July 1 by 3.8 million workers. It is estimated that the seasonal increase was made up of the following persons 14 years of age and over: 1.7 million rural-farm males, 0.8 million rural-farm females, and 0.4 million nonfarm persons. The balance consisted of .5 million persons under 14 years of age and 0.4 million persons whose primary occupation was nonagricultural but who assisted in farm work on a part-time basis. The majority of the persons in the latter two groups coming into seasonal farm work are also farm residents, so that of the 3.8 million seasonal January to July increase in 1940, only about .5 million workers came from nonfarm sources.

On January 1, 1943 there were approximately 8.2 million workers employed on farms. To equal last year's employment level on July 1 of this year, namely 12 million workers, will require a seasonal increase of 3.8 million workers. If it is assumed that there will be the same number of nonfarm persons at work on farms this July as a year ago, the available workers in the farm population for meeting the seasonal increase from January to July would include only 0.7 million males, not otherwise employed, and the remainder would have to be secured from the other groups, but in larger than usual numbers - possibly 1.4 million rural-farm females, 0.4 million nonfarm persons, 0.9 million persons under 14

5/ Seasonal factors in the volume of civilian migration taking place during the different quarters of the year and in the number of farm persons employed in both farm and nonfarm work make any accounting of losses, on other than a 12-month basis unsatisfactory. Consequently for a meaningful estimate, the losses should be compared between the corresponding dates of the years.

years of age, and 0.4 million persons whose primary occupation is at nonfarm work but who assist in seasonal farm operations a minor part of the work-week. Such seasonal increases would mean a total employment by July 1 of 8.7 million rural-farm persons and 1.2 million nonfarm persons. In addition there would be at work on farms 1.1 million persons under 14 and 1.0 million persons whose primary occupation is nonagricultural but who assist in farm work for a minor part of the work-week (tables 1 and 4).

To bring so many more farm women into the farm working force in the peak months of 1943 would mean the use of nearly 2 million rural-farm women 14 years of age and over as contrasted with 1.5 million in July 1942 and 1.0 million in July 1940. Whether as great a number can be brought into farm work is somewhat problematical, in view of the number of farm resident women likely to be employed in nonfarm occupations during 1943. Employment of farm women both in farm and nonfarm occupations would total in July slightly over a third of the entire female rural-farm population 14 years of age and over - a percentage practically equal to the estimated proportion of nonfarm women likely to be employed in nonagricultural occupations by the middle of 1943. It is possible, however, that the reserves of farm women not in the labor force are relatively more depleted in areas of greatest need for additional workers than in other areas. Should such levels of use of farm women and of the other categories of farm workers occur, the composition of the farm working force in 1943 will be quite different from that of the 1942 working force in certain important respects. Rural-farm males 14 years of age and over and engaged primarily in farm work will comprise approximately 56 percent of total farm employment by July 1943, compared with 61 percent in July 1942 and 69 percent in July 1940. The proportion of rural-farm females and of children under 14 will have doubled since July 1940 (table 4).

By October, when farm employment again rises to a peak, primarily as a result of the cotton and other late fall crop harvesting, the farm labor supply situation may not be materially different from that in July. Losses of actual or potential workers through migration and inductions during the July to October quarter are estimated to be about 120,000, and will affect farm employment only to a minor extent. As may be noted from the quarterly estimates presented in table 2, the heaviest civilian outmigration from farms occurs during the last quarter of the year. Likewise the greatest shift of farm persons into nonfarm work also occurs during the last quarter. Both of these types of movements are due to the seasonality in agricultural work affecting the movement and the availability of persons for nonfarm work. The direction of movement normally reverses itself during the first half of the year. Thus the cumulative losses shown in the last line of table 2 for January 1 dates contain normal seasonal outmovement and occupational shift occurring during the last quarter of the year, in addition to the more or less permanent losses sustained. The higher level of cumulative losses for a January 1 date in any year should therefore be interpreted in the light of its seasonal component.

Manpower Measures for Meeting 1943 Production

The above estimates of rural-farm manpower utilization assume only the same degree of participation in farm work by nonfarm persons as during last year. Moreover, they make no allowance for any special measures which may (1) result in a net increase in the number of nonfarm persons working on farms this year,

(2) further reduce the number of farm workers withdrawn into the armed forces, or (3) provide for a fuller use of manpower on farms than is occurring gradually through adjustments made on the initiative of the individual operators or workers who expand their operations or move to better farms or farm jobs.

While it is conceivable that a farm employment level equal to that of last year might be achieved without the vigorous prosecution of measures of manpower mobilization it would be extremely hazardous to forego such measures and still count on full war production of agricultural products. It would require utilizing during the peak season of the year every rural-farm male 14 years of age and over physically capable of work, who is not already fully employed in nonfarm work. In other months of the year it would require continued participation in farm work of a large proportion of school-age farm youth and of considerably greater numbers of women and children than in the same months of 1942. Even if we should have so numerically complete a use of rural-farm manpower, without recourse to special measures of manpower mobilization attainment of the 1943 production goals may be threatened, since areas of higher manpower losses often do not coincide with areas of greater labor supply and since the persons leaving are not always those that can best be spared - very frequently the opposite has occurred. A part of the estimated total national farm manpower potential is located in areas where the opportunities for effective contribution to agricultural production are not present, so that fuller utilization of this manpower in 1943 is not automatically possible without changes in the present distribution of the available labor supply and in its degree of utilization. Furthermore, the high proportion of women, older men, youths, and children in the farm working force may reduce its work capacity to such an extent that an employment volume equal to last year's would not be equally productive and would not be sufficient to achieve the estimated 5 percent increase in the 1943 agricultural output stipulated by the goals.

There are, however, a number of factors present in the agricultural manpower outlook for 1943 and the early part of 1944 which may materially mitigate the stringent situation suggested by the above considerations and by the projections for 1943 in the accompanying tables. A program for mobilizing local labor resources, including both farm and nonfarm men, women, and school-age youth is being developed. Expansion of the Department's current program of recruiting, training, and transporting workers for year-round and seasonal work on farms may substantially supplement the available local manpower resources. Other measures which may provide a fuller utilization of available labor include any steps taken to facilitate the movement of farm workers from relatively unproductive to more productive farms or to provide for more complete use on their own farms of the time of farmers whose operations are now too limited to afford full-time employment. Related measures include any developments which would make available to farmers more farm machinery and repair parts, thus reducing manpower requirements, or any measures which would provide a more rational movement of seasonal migratory workers by reducing to a minimum the time lost between jobs and by providing longer periods of employment to these workers. Shifts in crop enterprises which release workers from crops less essential to the war effort to meet the demand for larger production of more essential crops constitute still another measure. A start is being made to recruit farm workers from less productive areas and to train them for jobs as year-round workers on more productive farms. These and related measures for increasing production on small and large farms will need to be carried much further as agriculture moves toward the maximum production level demanded by all-out war conditions.

Some measures of the scale of operations and manpower requirements of farms of different sizes is provided by the war unit criterion currently used by Selective Service. The war unit measure of a farm's operations takes into consideration not only the acreage in crops and livestock numbers, but also gives weight to the relative essentiality of different commodities to the war effort and the amount of labor required in their production. In general 16 war units are considered to represent full-time farm work for an able bodied man during the year, although under some production conditions or for some crops having high seasonal labor requirements 16 war units may be more than the amount of farm work an able bodied male worker could perform, while on some types of farms, it may be less. On the basis of 1940 Census data, it is tentatively estimated that nearly 40 percent of the farms of the country had 16 or more war units, while approximately two-thirds of the farms had more than 8 war units. The percentage of farms with less than 8 war units varies considerably in the different sections of the country, being larger in the South than, for example, in the Middle West, and comprising approximately a third of the Nation's farms. ^{6/} There are thus a large number of farms in various sections of the country which are so small as to utilize inadequately the family workers now on those farms.

The effects of present Selective Service regulations regarding the deferment of farm workers under the 8 to 16 war unit standard have been estimated in table 5 on the basis of the estimated number of males in military ages now residing and regularly working on farms and on the basis of the number of males in the same age groups not living on farms but regularly employed in farm work. As of January 1 of this year it is estimated that there were on farms 3.5 million males in the 18-37 year age group. Only 2.6 million, however, are estimated to be employed regularly in farm work as a major occupation, while approximately 900,000 are employed in nonfarm work primarily. In addition to the farm resident males 18-37 years of age and employed in agriculture there are approximately 330,000 nonfarm resident males in this age group employed in farm work as a major occupation. It is roughly estimated that a uniform and liberal application of the war unit standards so as to defer farm workers responsible for 8 or more war units would result in a reclassification to the deferred status (classes 2-C or 3-C) of about 2.1 million out of the nearly 2.9 million farm workers in the military age group, or nearly 73 percent of all. A moderate application of the war unit standard so as to defer farm workers responsible for 12 or more war units would result in an estimated reclassification of about 61 percent of all farm workers in military ages. Since some of these farm workers would have been rejected for physical reasons from military service even if they had not been reclassified the net effect of the Selective Service war unit standards might mean the deferment of 750,000 to 1 million farm workers who in the absence of dependency deferments would be liable for military service, depending on the strictness or liberality and the uniformity with which the war unit standard would be applied. There is a relatively large number of men in military ages living on farms but engaged primarily in nonfarm occupations who are unaffected by the farm deferment measures so long as they remain in non-farm employment. These numbered approximately 900,000 men. In addition there were some 750,000 other males in the military age groups living on farms who were not subject to reclassification inasmuch as they were not sufficiently

^{6/} Excluding about 800,000 marginal units with part-time or retired operators, which are included under the Census definition of a "farm."

occupied in agricultural work to have a minimum of 8 war units. Thus even under a liberal application of the present Selective Service regulations there are now living on farms an estimated 1.7 million men of military age who would not be subject to a 2-C or 3-C classification either because of nonfarm employment or so little employment on farms as to have less than 8 war units. To the extent, therefore, that a further liberalizing of deferment of farm workers takes place, there will be a considerable increase in the number of men deferred from military service as compared with the number likely to be deferred under present regulations. However, most of the additional deferments would be on the smallest farms and unless the deferred farm workers are made available for work on more productive farms their contribution to agricultural production would be limited.

PREFATORY NOTE TO TABLES

Projections for 1943 are based on the following assumptions:

1. That the armed forces will increase approximately 4 million during 1943, bringing the total military and naval strength for all branches of the services, including the women's auxiliaries or reserves, to 10.8 million by the end of the year;
2. That total nonfarm employment will show a net decrease of about 700,000 by the beginning of next year with curtailment of employment in less essential nonagricultural industries and in construction and trade, only partly offset by expansion of employment in munitions and essential nonagricultural industries;
3. That total farm employment in 1943 will be maintained at approximately the same levels as in corresponding months of 1942;
4. That unemployment will decrease to a minimum of 1 million by January 1944;
5. That migration from farms in 1943 will be reduced, with a net migration from the rural-farm population of approximately .9 million persons of all ages through civilian movement and inductions, as compared with 1.6 million in 1942 and 1.3 million in 1941;
6. That present regulations for the deferment of essential farm workers will reduce inductions of men from the rural-farm population to 430,000 as compared with an estimated 800,000 which would take place in the absence of any agricultural occupation deferments and under the assumption of a contribution proportionate to the male population in the military age groups;
7. That the marked trend of the past three years in the number of farm residents taking nonfarm jobs while continuing to live on farms will be slackened, and that by January 1, 1944 there will be no net increase in the number of farm residents working at nonfarm jobs over a year earlier;
8. That total farm employment in 1943 will include the same numbers of nonfarm residents as in 1942, and that the losses of rural-farm males will be replaced primarily by rural-farm persons previously not working;
9. That the lowered quality of the replacements used in farm employment will tend to be offset through more effective distribution and utilization of workers and machinery, reduction of loss of time between jobs of seasonal workers, reorganization of some enterprises, elimination of nonessential operations, etc.-

Table 1.- Estimates of manpower utilization, April 1940 to January 1944 1/

Employment status	1940	1941	1942	1943 2/	1944 2/
	Apr. 1:July 1:Oct. 1:Jan. 1:Apr. 1:July 1:Oct. 1:Jan. 1:Apr. 1:July 1:Oct. 1:Jan. 1				
	(Millions of Persons)				
Total population 14 years old and over	101.1	101.4	101.7	102.0	102.2
Not in labor force	46.7	44.1	45.5	48.0	44.5
In labor force	54.4	57.3	56.2	53.4	54.2
Armed forces 2/	.5	.5	.7	.9	1.4
Civilian labor force	53.9	56.8	55.5	52.5	52.8
Unemployed 4/	8.8	9.1	7.3	7.5	6.5
Employed	45.1	47.7	48.2	45.0	46.3
Nonfarm employment 5/	36.3	37.0	37.7	37.3	37.7
Farm employment 6/	8.8	10.7	10.5	7.7	8.6
Rural-farm persons	7.9	9.5	9.3	6.9	7.8
Males	7.4	8.5	8.1	6.7	7.3
Females	.5	1.0	1.2	.2	.5
Nonfarm persons 7/	.9	1.2	1.2	.8	.8
Farm employment, persons under 14 8/	.2	.6	.7	.1	.3
Employed in farm and nonfarm work 9/	.7	1.0	1.0	.6	.7
Total farm employment 10/	9.7	12.3	12.2	8.4	9.6

1/ Figures for April 1940 are based on Census data with adjustments for comparability with data for subsequent dates; all other figures are estimates of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics as of March 1943 unless otherwise noted.

2/ Preliminary. Farm employment figures show a projected composition, assuming approximately the same levels of employment as in corresponding dates for 1942 and assuming the same number of nonfarm persons employed in farm work as in 1942. The figures are not to be interpreted as forecasts of 1943 farm employment.

3/ Unofficial, based on published information.

4/ Includes persons on public emergency work (WPA, etc.).

5/ Includes (1) nonagricultural employment as estimated by the Bureau of the Census through January 1943, and (2) an allowance for off-farm employment in agricultural servicing and processing establishments classified by the Census as in "agriculture."

6/ These estimates include only those persons 14 years of age and over working on farms the equivalent of 2 or more days a week and engaged in farm work for a greater part of the work-week than in nonfarm occupations. See footnotes 9 and 10.

7/ Includes urban-farm residents.

8/ The great majority of these children are unpaid family members working on their parents' farms.

9/ Estimated number of persons employed on farms for a lesser part of the work-week than in nonfarm occupations. These persons are already included in the estimate of nonfarm employment shown above, but enter into the total farm employment since they work on farms not less than 2 days a week.

10/ Persons working on farms the equivalent of 2 or more days a week.

Table 2.- Estimated effects of migration and occupational shifts on the supply of actual or potential farm workers living on farms, cumulative from April 1, 1940 to specified dates

Losses - cumulative since April 1, 1940 to:-	1942		1943		1944	
	January 1: April 1:	July 1: October 1:	January 1: April 1:	July 1: October 1:	January 1:	July 1:
	(Thousands of Persons)					
Net migration from rural-farm population	2,192	2,310	2,512	2,925	3,792	3,870
Entrance into armed forces ^{1/}	283	406	604	812	1,012	1,166
Net civilian migration - all ages	1,909	1,904	1,908	2,113	2,780	2,704
Persons under 14	451	449	450	499	656	638
Persons 14 years old and over	1,458	1,455	1,458	1,614	2,124	2,066
Actual or potential workers	960	958	960	1,063	1,398	1,360
Others	498	497	498	551	726	706
Net withdrawals from on-farm labor supply through shifts into other occupations without change of residence ^{2/}	1,900	1,600	1,200	1,300	2,100	1,700
Total losses to on-farm labor supply of actual or potential farm workers ^{2/}	3,143	2,964	2,764	3,175	4,510	4,226
					3,934	4,056
						5,127

^{1/} Unofficial. Inductions up to 1943 were assumed to be proportional to men in the military age group in the rural-farm population except for a minor adjustment for relative incidence of disqualifying characteristics. Enlistments from rural-farm population estimated on basis of available information regarding relative rates of enlistments from farm and nonfarm persons. Beginning with 1943 (and to some extent in the last quarter of 1942), downward adjustments from a proportional contribution were made to allow for possible effects of the Selective Service regulations.

^{2/} Increase in employment of farm residents in nonfarm occupations less the increase in such persons who continue to work in agriculture a minor part of the work-week.

^{3/} Sum of: (1) losses to armed forces; (2) actual or potential workers in civilian migration; and (3) net withdrawals from shifts into other occupations without change of residence. Normal increases in the working age population living on farms have not been deducted from the estimated total losses. These losses do not relate to any changes in the supply of potential farm workers not living on farms.

Table 3.- Estimated rural-farm population by employment status and sex, April and July 1940 and quarterly dates January 1942-January 1944 1/

Employment status	1940		1942		1943		1944				
	Apr. 1	July 1	Jan. 1	Apr. 1	July 1	Oct. 1	Jan. 1	Apr. 1	July 1	Oct. 1	Jan. 1
	(Thousands of Persons)										
Total rural-farm population (all ages)	30,216	30,515	28,733	28,718	28,619	28,309	27,545	27,570	27,591	27,503	27,088
Persons 14 years old and over	21,357	21,600	20,258	20,231	20,122	19,849	19,231	19,227	19,225	19,172	18,886
Not in labor force	10,353	9,026	9,184	8,666	7,484	7,316	8,335	7,879	6,723	6,780	8,146
In labor force	11,004	12,574	11,074	11,565	12,638	12,533	10,896	11,348	12,502	12,392	10,740
Employed in farm work 2/	7,900	9,500	6,600	7,400	8,800	8,700	6,600	7,300	8,700	8,600	6,500
Employed in nonfarm occupations	2,100	2,300	3,900	3,800	3,600	3,700	4,100	3,900	3,700	3,700	4,100
Unemployed 2/	1,004	774	574	365	238	133	196	148	102	92	140
Males (all ages)	15,940	16,080	15,013	14,937	14,783	14,517	14,029	13,958	13,896	13,805	13,560
Persons 14 years old and over	11,418	11,532	10,685	10,605	10,447	10,200	9,784	9,700	9,628	9,556	9,375
Not in labor force	1,699	789	1,227	945	409	482	903	707	400	475	875
In labor force	9,719	10,473	9,458	9,660	10,038	9,718	8,881	8,993	9,228	9,081	8,500
Employed in farm work 2/	7,442	8,455	6,197	6,682	7,295	7,047	5,993	6,314	6,744	6,622	5,850
Employed in nonfarm occupations	1,457	1,688	2,808	2,698	2,570	2,579	2,751	2,578	2,417	2,399	2,559
Unemployed 2/	820	600	453	280	173	92	137	101	67	60	91
Females (all ages)	14,276	14,435	13,720	13,781	13,836	13,792	13,516	13,612	13,695	13,698	13,528
Persons 14 years old and over	9,939	10,068	9,573	9,626	9,675	9,649	9,447	9,527	9,597	9,616	9,511
Not in labor force	8,654	8,237	7,957	7,721	7,075	6,834	7,432	7,172	6,323	6,305	7,271
In labor force	1,285	1,831	1,616	1,905	2,600	2,815	2,015	2,355	3,274	3,311	2,240
Employed in farm work 2/	458	1,045	403	718	1,505	1,653	607	986	1,956	1,978	650
Employed in nonfarm occupations	643	612	1,092	1,102	1,030	1,121	1,349	1,322	1,283	1,301	1,541
Unemployed 2/	184	174	121	85	65	41	59	47	35	32	49

1/ Figures for April 1940 are based on Census data with adjustments for comparability with data for subsequent dates; all other figures are estimates of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics as of March 1943.

2/ Includes only farm residents 14 years of age and over engaged primarily in farm work; for total farm employment, see Table 1.

3/ Includes persons on public emergency work (WPA, etc.).

Table 4.- Estimated composition of farm employment on July 1 dates, 1940-1943

Classification	July 1, 1940		July 1, 1941		July 1, 1942		July 1, 1943 ^{1/}	
	Million	Percent	Million	Percent	Million	Percent	Million	Percent
Total farm employment	12.3	100.0	11.9	100.0	12.0	100.0	12.0	100.0
Workers 14 years old and over	11.7	95	11.2	94	11.0	92	10.9	91
Living on farms and engaged primarily in farm work	9.5	77	9.0	76	8.8	74	8.7	73
Males	8.5	69	7.9	67	7.3	61	6.7	56
Females	1.0	8	1.1	9	1.5	13	2.0	17
Not living on farms but engaged primarily in farm work	1.2	10	1.2	10	1.2	10	1.2	10
Working on farms at least 2 days a week but engaged primarily in nonfarm work	1.0	8	1.0	8	1.0	8	1.0	8
Workers under 14 years of age	.6	5	.7	6	1.0	8	1.1	9

^{1/} Projected composition assuming the same level of employment as in July 1942, and assuming the same number of nonfarm persons employed in farm work as in 1942. The figures are not to be interpreted as forecasts of 1943 farm employment.

Table 5.-- Preliminary estimates of male farm workers 18-37 years of age subject to draft deferment on the basis of alternative interpretations of the "war unit" standards

Classification	Interpretation of 8 to 16 war unit rule		
	: Strict	: Moderate	: Liberal
Total number of males aged 18-37 in the rural-farm population	: 3,505,000	3,505,000	3,505,000
Rural-farm males aged 18-37 regularly engaged in farm work <u>1/</u>	: 2,559,000	2,559,000	2,559,000
Subject to 2-C or 3-C classification	: 1,241,000	1,496,000	1,814,000
Percent of all rural-farm males aged 18-37 subject to 2-C or 3-C classification <u>2/</u>	: 35.4	42.7	51.8
Net deferment of farm workers who live on farms, assuming 50 percent rejections <u>3/</u>	: 621,000	748,000	907,000
Nonfarm resident males aged 18-37 regularly engaged in farm work	: 327,000	327,000	327,000
Subject to 2-C or 3-C classification	: 231,000	264,000	282,000
Net deferment of farm workers who do not live on farms, assuming 50 percent rejections <u>3/</u>	: 115,000	132,000	141,000
All males aged 18-37 regularly engaged in farm work	: 2,886,000	2,886,000	2,886,000
Subject to 2-C or 3-C classification	: 1,472,000	1,760,000	2,096,000
Percent of all male farm workers aged 18-37 subject to 2-C or 3-C classification <u>2/</u>	: 51.0	61.0	72.6
Net deferment of farm workers assuming 50 percent rejections <u>3/</u>	: 736,000	880,000	1,048,000

1/ Of the 3,500,000 males aged 18-37 estimated to be living on farms as of January 1, 1943, approximately 900,000 are estimated to be employed in nonfarm work as a major occupation, and less than 40,000 to be unemployed.

2/ This percentage is a rough indication of the estimated decrease in the number of inductions of rural-farm males which would result from deferment of farm workers according to the indicated interpretation of the war unit standards.

3/ Unofficial indications suggest that this may be approximately the present rate of rejections for physical, mental, or moral reasons.

